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MSE walls are widely used in site development, primarily due to their low cost when compared with conventional retaining structures; 
however, the costs to repair or reconstruct a poorly performing wall likely outweigh these initial savings.  This paper includes a 
summary of three MSE walls that have experienced either a complete failure (collapse) or have undergone significant movement, 
adversely affecting wall performance.  In each case history, the likely cause of failure and the solution for rehabilitation of the 
structures are presented, along with the approximate cost of repair.  Several projects in which other methods of stabilization were used 
are also presented in limited detail.  Methods of repair or stabilization are compared with regard to constructibility, cost, and their 
applicability to various failure mechanisms and site constraints. 
 
  
CASE HISTORIES INTRODUCTION 
  
Three case histories are reviewed in detail herein, and several 
others are discussed for comparison.  All of the case histories 
are located in the eastern United States.  Parameters describing 
the wall and the design of each structure are defined as 
follows: 
MSE walls have become a staple to both commercial and 
residential development over the last 10 to 20 years.  This is 
the result of improved understanding of the systems and 
design methodologies, but primarily because of their 
significant cost benefit over conventional retaining structures.  
  
Height:  Maximum exposed wall height Prior to the advent of the geosynthetic reinforced Segmental 
Retaining Wall (SRW), MSE walls were common to large 
highway projects.  These systems typically consist of pre-cast 
concrete facing elements with metallic reinforcement, and 
backfill within the reinforced zone is nearly always specified 
as a free draining processed aggregate or sand.  Alternatively, 
on-site soils (often fine grained) are commonly used for SRW 
construction, creating an even more cost-effective structure. 
The cost of geosynthetic reinforced walls has been shown to 
be over 25 percent less than walls with metallic reinforcement, 
and about half the cost of more traditional gravity walls 
(Koerner et al., 1998). 
Geogrid Length:  Length of geogrid measured from face of 
wall 
Backfill:  Classification of soil within the reinforced zone 
according to ASTM D2488 
Unit Weight:  Soil unit weight (moist) used in design 




Case History 1:  SRW Failure (Reith et al., 1999) 
 
This geogrid-reinforced SRW located in southeastern 
Pennsylvania was constructed in the Summer of 1997.  Wall 
design parameters were as follows: 
 
The cost benefits of MSE walls can be far outweighed by 
repair costs and lost revenue from a wall that does not perform 
as intended.  There have been numerous failures of MSE 
structures, often attributed to poor construction practices, 
overly aggressive designs, the use of unsuitable soils as 
backfill, and/or lack of internal drainage of the structures. 
There are numerous methods used to stabilize poorly 
performing walls, and their application is dependent upon the 
site constraints, cost of repair, and the mode of failure of the 
MSE wall. 
 
Table 1.  Wall Design Parameters 
 
Height 28 ft [8.3 m] 
Geogrid Length 16 ft [4.9 m] 
Backfill SM, ML 
Unit Weight 120 pcf [18.8 kN/m3] 
Internal Soil Friction Angle, φ 32° 
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 The wall design also included a 4 ft [1.2 m] thick layer of 
drainage stone (AASHTO No. 57) behind the facing along 
with a blanket drain at the bottom of the wall that extended 
beyond the back of the reinforced zone.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the wall section as designed. 
 
  
Fig. 1.  Typical Design Wall Section. Fig. 2. Photograph of First Failure. 
  
First Failure.  About 5 months after construction of the wall 
was completed, a failure occurred.  Prior to the failure, no 
signs of distress were reported.  The failure occurred during a 
relatively wet winter and spring, and followed several 
significant rain events.  Additionally, it was reported that a 
few days before the failure, the fire protection system was 
tested, releasing a large amount of water onto the parking lot 
above the retaining wall.  The wall failure was generally 
centered on a stormwater inlet to which the parking lot 
drained. 








   




Content 10.8 % 18-33%   As indicated in the photograph (Fig. 2), the failure was 
relatively shallow and the majority of the reinforced zone 
remained intact (only the facing and drainage stone collapsed). 
The results indicate that the material was not adequately 
compacted and wet of optimum.  It is also possible that the 
materials tested in the field had undergone deformation due to 
the failure, lowering their density.  The daily field reports 
prepared by the geotechnical engineer’s representatives during 
construction indicated that the material was placed and 
compacted to at least 95% of the maximum dry density. 
 
The dismantling of the wall was closely observed by several 
geotechnical engineers.  Soil samples were collected and 
laboratory testing performed.  The soils classified as Silty 
Sand (SM) and Sandy Silt (ML) with between 20 and 50 
percent passing the No. 200 sieve.  A Modified Proctor test 
(ASTM D1557) was performed on material obtained from the 
failure area.  Additionally, in-place density testing was 
performed on the soil during dismantling.  Laboratory and 
field results are summarized in Table 2.  Laboratory data 
shown is the optimum moisture content and the maximum dry 
density according to ASTM D1557. 
 
Observations during removal of the wall indicated that the 
geogrid reinforcement was generally placed at the locations 
and to the lengths specified on the design drawings; however, 
the drainage stone at the face of the wall did not appear to 
have been placed as specified.  The thickness of the stone 
ranged from the design thickness of 4 ft [1.2 m] down to less 
than 1 foot [0.3 m] and it appeared that in several areas, the 
drainage stone was contaminated with soil.     Removal of the stormwater pipe that flowed from the 
stormwater inlet revealed that the pipe joints were not sealed, 
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 one joint.  Both the pipe and inlet were bedded on stone that 
was likely connected to the facing drainage layer of the SRW. 
Wall Repair.  Because the SRW collapsed completely, re-
construction was believed to be the most efficient and cost-
effective means of repair for the two failed sections.  
The location and type of failure, poorly constructed storm 
drain, and timing of the collapse all pointed to hydrostatic 
pressure as the cause of failure.  Additionally, the fact that the 
wall collapsed without showing significant signs of movement 
suggests a failure resulting from the relatively sudden 
introduction of large volumes of water to the drainage system. 
 
The first failed section was repaired using the original design 
geogrid lengths and spacing; however, a dense-graded 
aggregate was used in place of the on-site soils.  A higher 
strength geogrid was also used to account for possible 
installation damage caused by the aggregate fill. 
  
Second Failure.  About two months after the first failure was 
repaired (see next section for details on repair), tension cracks 
and settlement of the pavement above a separate section of the 
SRW were observed.  Over the next two to three months, the 
cracks opened wider and settlement continued to nearly 8 
inches [20 cm] of vertical displacement (see Fig. 3).  The wall 
also began to bulge near its midpoint and finally collapsed. 
The second failed section was repaired similarly; however, 
geogrid lengths were increased by about 5 ft [1.5 m].  Dense 
graded aggregate was also used as backfill for this section. 
 
The total cost of reconstruction of the two collapsed sections 
is estimated to be about $100,000, which corresponds to about 
$35/s.f. [$377/m2] of wall face.  This compares to an original 
estimated construction cost of $15/s.f. Additionally, 
engineering fees to evaluate the failures (including field 
investigations and laboratory testing) and provide additional 




The integrity of the remainder of the SRW remains 
questionable; however, the owner has chosen not to perform 
additional studies or repair any of the remaining sections.  The 
wall has performed adequately to date. 
 
 
Case History 2:  SRW Failure 
  
Fig. 3.  Second failure prior to collapse. This geogrid reinforced SRW is located in northern Georgia. 
Construction was completed in summer, 1994.  Wall design 
parameters were as follows: 
 
The relatively slow, progressive failure of this section 
contrasted the first failure, which occurred without warning. 
Additionally, the reinforced zone experienced significant 
movement and the failure more closely resembled a classic 
wedge or log-spiral type failure. 
 
Table 3.  Wall Design Parameters 
 
Height 26 ft [8.0 m] 
Geogrid Length 13.5 ft [4.1 m] 
Backfill SM, SC 
Unit Weight 130 pcf 
Internal Soil Friction Angle, φ 30° 
 
A subsurface exploration was performed between the initial 
identification of movement and the eventual failure.  The 
exploration included test borings along the entire wall length. 
Standard penetration testing (SPT) was performed and 
undisturbed samples were obtained for direct shear and in-
place density tests.  The results of the testing indicated that the 
reinforced soils were in a loose to very loose state, field 
compaction was in the range of 80 to 90 percent of the 
maximum dry density, and the moisture content of the samples 
was well above optimum.  Additionally, direct shear testing 
indicated effective friction angles (φ) ranging from 30.5 to 
33.7 degrees. 
 
The original design included a 1-ft [0.3-m] layer of drainage 
stone behind the block facing, and a drainage composite at the 
back of the reinforced zone.  A concrete flume was 
constructed at the top of the wall to collect runoff from the 
hillside above the wall and direct it to the storm drainage 
system. 
 
Wall Failure. The highest section of the SRW failed in March 
1996 during a heavy rainstorm.  There is little data available 
regarding the condition of the wall prior to the failure.  The 
owner contracted with an engineering consultant to evaluate 
the design of the wall and the failure.  The findings of this 
evaluation included the following comments: 
 
The second failure was attributed to poor compaction of the 
reinforced soils along with hydrostatic build up within the 
reinforced zone (likely due to poorly constructed drainage, 
similar to the first failure). 
 • The geogrid reinforcement was shorter and vertical 
spacing was greater than would normally be expected for 
this type of structure. 
Paper No. 5.30  3 
 • Graded aggregate was used in lieu of the open graded 
stone specified for drainage stone. 
• The wall face was constructed vertically instead of at the 
1H:16V batter specified in the design. 
• The concrete flume appeared to have been constructed in 
a manner that promoted flow along the ground surface 
upslope of the flume, causing erosion of this material and 
possibly infiltration into the reinforced mass. 
 
The engineer concluded that all of these conditions may have 
contributed to the wall collapse, and recommended that the 
wall be reconstructed using a more conservative design with 
proper drainage, and runoff either be redirected away from the 
wall or the flume properly constructed. 
 
The failed area of the wall was cleaned up and the intact SRW 
blocks were stockpiled on site. The wall remained in this 
condition (see Fig. 4) until April 1998 when additional 
analyses were performed and engineering design for 
reconstruction and repair of the wall was initiated (by an 
engineering firm not involved in the previous investigations). 
 
Fig. 4.  Photograph of failed section. 
 
Wall Repair.  Analyses were performed to evaluate the 
stability of the non-failed portions of the SRW.  A parametric 
evaluation was performed for the existing wall geometry and 
reinforcement layout with varying soil properties.  The results 
indicated marginal factors of safety for both internal and 
external stability, with the critical failure being a compound-
type failure plan extending from the wall face at about one-
third the wall height to just beyond the reinforcement.  This 
surface corresponded reasonably with the actual failure that 
occurred. 
 
The owner was presented with the results of this analysis and 
chose to reconstruct the failed portion of the wall and provide 
stabilization for the remainder of the wall.  Preliminary 
evaluations indicated that stabilization using tiebacks or soil 
nails was more cost effective than demolition and 
reconstruction of the entire wall. 
 
For the failed section of the wall, regrading above the wall 
would be performed to reduce the height of the wall by as 
much as 3 ft [0.9 m].  A 100± ft [30 m] long intact section 
remained between the failure and the end of the wall.  The top 
block courses were removed from this section and the backfill 
regraded.  This reduced the height of this intact section 
(increasing stability) and provided additional blocks to use in 
reconstruction of the failed section.  The design for the 
reconstructed portion utilized on-site fill (or soil borrow) for 
the reinforced zone, and geogrid lengths were increased by 1.5 
ft [0.4 m] in the lower one-third of the wall, and 5 ft [1.5 m] in 
the upper portions.  Drainage stone was included behind the 
block facing, and a drainage composite was installed behind 
the reinforced zone extending from the base of the wall to 
within 8 ft [2.4 m] of the top of wall. 
 
Soil nails were used to stabilize the remaining portions of the 
SRW.  Two rows of soil nails spaced at 5 ft [1.5 m] vertically 
and 7.5 ft [2.3 m] horizontally were installed through the SRW 
block facing.  An 8-inch [0.2-m] thick shotcrete facing was 
provided to a height of about 8 ft [2.4 m] in front of the SRW. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the soil nail stabilization. 
  
The grading above the wall was modified to redirect some 
runoff away from the wall.  Portions of the concrete flume 
were removed, and a vegetated swale was used to replace the 




















Fig. 5.  Soil Nail Stabilization - Typical Section. 
 
Fig. 6.  Photograph of stabilized portion of wall using soil 
nails and shotcrete.  
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 The cost for reconstruction of the failed section (about 5,500 
s.f. [510 m2]) of the wall was $120,000, or about $22/s.f. 
[$237/m2].  This included regrading above the wall.  
Wall Movement.  In December 2002, cracks in the pavement 
appeared above the wall.  Additionally, the backfill between 
the top of wall and the curb showed signs of surface erosion. 
Survey points along the curb above the wall were established 
to monitor horizontal and vertical movement over a three-
month period.  Movements were detected and the cracking 
above the wall increased (Fig. 8).  The area between the wall 
face and the curb also continued to erode, likely caused by 
several heavy rain events during the monitoring period.  
 
About 2,500 s.f of block were salvaged and re-used from the 
original failure and dismantling of portions of the wall. 
 
Soil nail stabilization cost was $180,000, which equates to 
about $40/s.f [$430/m2] for the 4,500 s.f [420 m2] of soil nail 
wall; however, the net unit cost to stabilize the 10,800 s.f. 
[1000 m2] of SRW was about $17/s.f. [$180/ m2]. 
 
 
Case History 3:  Wrap Face Wall  
 
This wall, located in central South Carolina, is a geogrid-
reinforced structure with a wrapped, vegetated facing.  The 
facing system consists of a geogrid and erosion control blanket 
wrapped within a welded-wire fabric form. The face of the 
wall has a batter of 1H:18V.  Original construction was 
completed in the Fall of 2001.  Wall design parameters were 
as follows: 
 
Table 4.  Wall Design Parameters 
 
Height 29 ft [8.8 m] 
Geogrid Length 16 ft [4.9 m] 
Backfill SM, ML 
Unit Weight 130 pcf [20.4 kN/m3] 
Internal Soil Friction Angle, φ 32° 
 
Fig. 8.  Photograph showing tension cracks above wall. 
 
Field investigations, including test pits and installation of 
inclinometers, were promptly initiated.  The shallow test pit 
indicated that the soils (sandy silts) appeared to have been 
compacted in accordance with the specifications.  A bulk 
sample was obtained from the test pit, and direct shear testing 
was performed on a recompacted sample.  The results of the 
testing indicated that if the material was properly compacted, 
the effective friction angle should have been greater than that 
assumed in design of the wall.  The inclinometer data 
confirmed the lateral movement of the reinforced mass with 
readings of about 0.05 inch [0.13 cm] per day over a 6-week 
period.  This prompted design of stabilization measures. 
 
A stone chimney drain was provided at the back of the 
reinforced zone.  The wall was constructed on an existing 
steep slope (1.5H:1V) where partially weathered rock was 
present at the surface in some areas and at a maximum 
estimated depth of 5 ft.  The foundation for the highest portion 
of the wall consisted of disintegrated rock.  A typical section 
of the wall is shown in Fig. 7. 
 
Wall Stabilization.  Although the reasons for the initial 
instability were not clear, it was apparent that surface water 
infiltration was a major contributor to the continuing 
movement, and failure was likely.  A stabilization design was 
developed using driven mechanical earth anchors.  To design 
the anchors, a stability analysis was performed, and the soil 
parameters were adjusted until a factor of safety of about 1.0 
was obtained for a failure surface that represented the 
conditions observed based on the on-going monitoring and 
inclinometer data.  Anchors were then sized and spaced such 
that the factor of safety was increased to 1.35 given the same 
parameters. 
 
The stabilization design called for two rows of Manta Ray 
anchors at 10-ft [3-m] vertical spacing, and horizontal spacing 
ranging from 7 to 9 ft [2.1 to 2.7 m].  These anchors are 
typically driven into the soil.  Once installed, the anchor head 
is pulled and a “tipping plate” at the end of the anchor locks 
 
Fig. 7.  Typical Section. 
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 into the surrounding soil.  At the start of anchor installation, 
the contractor encountered anchor refusal before installation to 
the required depth; therefore, the anchors were installed into 
predrilled holes.  Initially, there were doubts as to whether the 
tipping plate would fully open within the weathered rock; 
however, installation of the Manta Ray anchors proceeded 
smoothly.  The anchor load was distributed using a 3.5 ft × 2.5 
ft [1.1 m × 0.8 m] steel plate. 
 
Fig. 9.  Anchor Installation. 
 
During construction of these stabilization measures, it was 
found that the upper rows of wire forms were not sufficiently 
stable to support the anchors and bearing plates.  The upper 8 
ft± [2.4 m] of the MSE wall were removed and reconstructed 
using a modified wrapped face detail, increased geogrid 
lengths, and sand backfill.  These modifications enhanced 
stability of the structure and allowed the contractor to 
eliminate anchors from portions of the wall with an exposed 
height of less than about 13 ft [4 m]. 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Upper portion of wall was reconstructed. 
 
The entire 5,000 s.f. [465 m2] of wrap face wall was stabilized 
and/or reconstructed.  The cost of anchor stabilization was 
$40,000 or about $8/s.f. [$86/m2], and the cost to reconstruct 
the upper portion of the wall was $40,000 or about $16/s.f. 
[$172/ m2].  Additional repairs to utilities and regrading were 
performed in conjunction with the wall repair at a cost of 
about $50,000; therefore the total rehabilitation cost was 
$130,000 ($26/s.f. [$280/m2]). 
 
 
Other MSE Stabilization Measures 
 
In addition to the methods presented in these case histories; 
other means have been used to stabilize MSE walls that have 
shown signs of distress.  Figure 11 shows an SRW that was 
stabilized using soldier piles and tiebacks.  Wood lagging was 
placed between the piles and the space between the existing 
SRW facing and the lagging was filled with open graded 
stone. 
 
Fig. 11.  Stabilization using Soldier Piles/Lagging w/Tiebacks.  
 
For another project, helical anchors and soldier piles were 
used to stabilize an SRW (see Fig. 12).  Other methods include 
construction of an earth berm in front of the wall (partial or 
full height) or structural buttressing from the exposed face. 
 
 Fig. 12.  Helical Anchor Stabilization. 
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 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The repair or reconstruction of MSE walls can be achieved 
through various methods.  These methods should be chosen 
based on the failure mechanism the MSE structure is 
exhibiting, along with the most cost effective solution based 
on site constraints. 
 
In cases where a complete collapse of a wall has occurred, 
reconstruction is the most obvious solution.  Although in 
many cases some of the materials (i.e., facing elements) can be 
re-used, reconstruction of the wall is typically more costly 
than the original construction.  Reasons for this increased cost 
include: 
 
Fig. 14.  Tiebacks to repair global stability problem. 
 • Cost of clean-up and dismantling of the existing structure Costs of tiebacks and soil nails in this application are 
comparable, depending on the site conditions.  SRW 
construction cost is typically on the order of $15 to $25/s.f. 
[$160/m2 to $270/ m2], approximately half of which is 
materials.  Dismantling an SRW is estimated at about $10/s.f. 
[$110/ m2], and the use of select backfill could increase the 
cost by as much as $12/s.f. [$110/ m2] (assuming a 20 ft 
reinforcement length).  Therefore, complete teardown and 
reconstruction of a geosynthetically reinforced SRW could be 
$40/s.f. [$430/ m2] or more, assuming that the block facing 
can be salvaged and reused.  It should be noted that these costs 
are estimates by the authors, based on experience with these 
technologies and estimates contained in Site Work and 
Landscape Cost Data (Balboni, ed., R.S. Means Company, 
Inc., 2002). 
• Additional conservatism built into the redesign by the 
engineer 
• Cost of additional features to enhance internal drainage 
• Cost of imported backfill to expedite construction or 
because the on-site soils are considered unsuitable 
 
If reconstruction is for only a portion of the wall that 
collapsed, the integrity of the remainder of the wall will often 
remain in question.  A full geotechnical investigation and 
evaluation may be required, and the results of this evaluation 
may necessitate some remedial work over the remainder of the 
structure. 
 
The selection of a stabilization method should be dependent 
upon the mode of failure or displacement of the MSE wall.  In 
cases where the internal stability of the reinforced mass or 
facing system is in question, methods such as soil nailing may 
further reinforce the mass to provide an adequate factor of 
safety.  Where external and global stability are of concern, 
tiebacks extending beyond the anticipated failure plane would 
be a more appropriate means of stabilization.  One concern 
with the use of either driven or helical type anchors is that 
these types of anchors are usually terminated at refusal.  If the 
anchor refuses at a length that does not extend through the 
failure plane, it has done nothing to enhance the stability of 
the structure. 
 
Table 5 summarizes costs of various stabilization methods. 
Costs for all methods except for reconstruction were obtained 
from FHWA (Munfakh et al., 1999) and increased by roughly 
20 percent (at the low end of the range given) to account for 
complications related to MSE stabilization. 
 
Table 5.  Comparison of Costs for SRW Stabilization 
 
Method Cost per s.f [m2] 
  
Reconstruction $20 - $50 [$215 - $540] 
Soil Nails $18 - $55 [$195 - $590] 
Soldier Pile/Lagging (anchored) $18 - $75 [$195 - $805] 




It should be noted that for the stabilization measures, the entire 
SRW wall height may not require stabilization (as in Case 
History 2); therefore, these costs could be significantly less 
than wall reconstruction. 
 
 
Fig. 13.  Soil nails to repair compound stability problem.  
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